In this paper we present a propositional logic programming language for reasoning under possibilistic uncertainty and represent ing vague knowledge. Formulas are repre sented by pairs (ip, a), where ip is a many valued proposition and a E [0, 1] is a lower bound on the belief on ip in terms of necessity measures. Belief states are modeled by pos sibility distributions on the set of all many valued interpretations. In this framework, (i) we define a syntax and a semantics of the gen eral underlying uncertainty logic; (ii) we pro vide a modus ponens-style calculus for a sub language of Horn-rules and we prove that it is complete for determining the maximum de gree of possibilistic belief with which a fuzzy propositional variable can be entailed from a set of formulas; and finally, (iii) we show how the computation of a partial matching be tween fuzzy propositional variables, in terms of necessity measures for fuzzy sets, can be included in our logic programming system. [Ishizuka and Kanai, 1985; Mukaidono et al., 1989; Li and Liu, 1990; Alsinet and Manya, 1996; Vojtas, 1998], possibilistic logic [Dubois et al., 1991] , probabilistic logic [Heinsohn, 1994; Lukasiewicz, 1998 ], evidential logic [Baldwin, 1987; Baldwin et al., 1995] or fuzzy operator logic [Weigert et al., 1993] . Depending on the underlying logic some systems are more suit able for dealing with vague knowledge, while others are more appropriate for reasoning under incomplete or imprecise knowledge. Although all of the fuzzy ex tensions of logic programming implement proof proce dures for fuzzy reasoning, only some of them allow to represent ill-known information in the language.
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INTRODUCTION
Logic programming languages have been applied to a wide range of areas such as Artificial Intelligence or Deductive Databases. Among these languages, Prolog is the most representative but it is not powerful enough for reasoning and representing knowledge in situations where there is vague, incomplete or imprecise informa tion. To overcome this problem, new logic program ming languages have been developed. They are based on a variety of non-standard logics such as multiple valued logics [Ishizuka and Kanai, 1985; Mukaidono et al., 1989; Li and Liu, 1990; Alsinet and Manya, 1996; Vojtas, 1998 ], possibilistic logic [Dubois et al., 1991] , probabilistic logic [Heinsohn, 1994; Lukasiewicz, 1998 ], evidential logic [Baldwin, 1987; Baldwin et al., 1995] or fuzzy operator logic [Weigert et al., 1993] . Depending on the underlying logic some systems are more suit able for dealing with vague knowledge, while others are more appropriate for reasoning under incomplete or imprecise knowledge. Although all of the fuzzy ex tensions of logic programming implement proof proce dures for fuzzy reasoning, only some of them allow to represent ill-known information in the language.
Our first objective in this paper is to define a proposi tional logic programming language for reasoning under possibilistic uncertainty and representing vague knowl edge. We represent formulas by pairs (ip, a), ip being a many-valued proposition built on fuzzy propositional variables and a E [0, 1] being a lower bound on the belief on ip in terms of necessity measures.
On the one hand, fuzzy propositional variables pro vide us a suitable representation model in situations where there is vague, incomplete or imprecise infor mation about the real world. For instance, the fuzzy statement "Peter is abouL35 years old" can be nicely represented by the fuzzy proposition Peter _is_about35 defined over the finite domain years_old. In the case abouL35 denotes a crisp interval of ages, the above proposition can be interpreted as "3x E about35 such that Peter is x years old". In the case abouL35 denotes a fuzzy interval with a membership function /-Labout-35, the above proposition can be interpreted in possibilis tic terms as "3x E [P,abouL35] a such that Peter is x years old is certain with a necessity of at least 1 -a" for each a E [0, 1] , where [ !-LabouL35]a denotes the a-cut of /-Labout-35. So, fuzzy propositions can be seen as (flexible) restrictions on an existential quantifier (see [Dubois et al., 1998 ]).
On the other hand, since we want to deal with fuzzy propositional variables in the language, the truth eval uation of formulas cannot be Boolean but many valued, and thus, our possibilistic logic programming language should be based on a many-valued logic as in [Alsinet et al., 1999] . Moreover, like in classi cal propositional logic programming systems, the lan guage should enable us to define an efficient proof method based on a complete calculus for determin ing the maximum degree of possibilistic belief with which a fuzzy propositional variable can be entailed from a set of formulas. To this end, first we define a general possibilistic logic based on the propositional Godel fuzzy logic and then, we focus our attention on the possibilistic language that results from considering the Horn-rule sublogic of Godel fuzzy logic.
The reason for choosing Godel logic as the underlying many-valued logic where to model fuzziness is two-fold: first, truth-functions of Godel logic are purely ordinal, that is, they are definable just from the ordering of the truth scale (see next section), no further algebraic op erations are required, and thus the use of this logic is in accordance with the simplest understanding, in terms of an ordering, of what a fuzzy, gradual property can be; and second, and non negligible at all, Godel logic has been proved to be fully compatible with an already proposed and suitable extension of necessity measures for fuzzy events, in the sense that Godel logic will al low to define a well behaved and featured possibilistic semantics on top of it (see Sections 3 and 4).
Our second objective is to extend the possibilistic logic programming language with a partial matching mech anism between fuzzy propositional variables based on a necessity-like measure. As we have recently proved in [Alsinet and Godo, 2000b] , this extension preserves completeness for a particular class of formulas. In our opinion, this is a key feature that justifies by itself the interest of such a logic programming system. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the syntax and the many-valued semantics of the language of propositional Godel fuzzy logic. In Section 3 we extend the language to allow possibilistic reasoning. In Section 4 we describe the uncertainty sublogic that our proof method can deal with and we prove that it is complete for determining the maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of fuzzy propositional variables. In Section 5, we show how the proof method can be extended to allow a semantical matching be tween fuzzy propositional variables. And, finally, in the last section we discuss some related work. Be cause of the lengthy proofs, proofs of propositions can be found in [Alsinet and Godo, 2000a] .
2

MANY-VALUED SEMANTICS: GODEL LOGIC
Following [Hajek, 1998 ], the language of propositional Godel fuzzy logic (denoted hereafter G) is built in the usual way from a (countable) set of propositional vari ables, a conjunction A, an implication -t and the truth constant 0. Further connectives are defined as follows:
•<p is <p -t 0 <p=:'lj; is (<p-t'lj;)l\('1/;-t<p)
The semantics of G is given by interpretations I of the propositional variables into the real unit interval [0, 1] which are extended to arbitrary formulas by means of the following rules:
For the derived connectives the truth-interpretations take these forms:
The following is an axiomatization1 of G:
The deduction rule of G is modus ponens. The no tion of proof is as usual. Completeness for G reads as follows: <pi s provable in G, written f-a <p, iff I(<p) = 1 for any interpretation I. Furthermore, G enjoys strong completeness as well. Namely, let T be an arbitrary theory over G, i.e. just a set of formulas. An inter pretation I is a model ofT iff I( 'If;) = 1 for all 'ljJ E T. Then, T proves <p, written T f-<p, iff I(<p) = 1 for any interpretation I which is a model ofT.
3
GENERAL POSSIBILISTIC REASONING OV ER GODEL
LOGIC
We have seen that fuzzy propositional variables are suitable for representing imprecise information as in the statement "Peter is abouL35 years old". Now, we are interested in extending the fuzzy propositional language to allow fuzzy reasoning under uncertainty which leads us to a more expressive language. For in stance, the statement "it is almost sure that Peter is abouL35 years old" is represented in this setting by a certainty-weighted fuzzy proposition (Peter _is_about35, 0.9), where the certainty value 0.9 expresses how much is believed the fuzzy statement "Peter is abouL35 years old" in terms of necessity measures.
In general, certainty weights are employed to model statements of the form "<p is a-certain", where <p repre sents vague, incomplete or imprecise knowledge about the real world. In this framework, this is formalized 1 Actually, logic G is equivalent to the extension of lntu itionistic logic with the pre-linearity axiom
as "rp is certain with a necessity of at least a" and is represented through a certainty-weighted Godel logic formula (rp, a [Dubois and Prade, 1991] The following remarks are worth noticing. The first one is that this definition is indeed an extension of the classical definition, in the sense that we recover it whenever [rp] is a crisp set. The second one is that with this definition, the condition N([rp] I 1r) 2: a is equivalent to
for every I E I, analogously to the crisp case as well. And the third one is that the equivalence
is also an interesting consequence. It is not difficult to see that this kind of necessity measures on fuzzy sets is characterized by the following set of axioms:
Now let us go into formal definitions. Definition 2 (Possibilistic satisfaction and en tailment) A possibilistic model 7r : I -+ [0, 1] sat isfies a weighted formula ( rp, a), written 1r I= ( rp, a) , iff N([rp] I 1r) 2: a. Now let r be a set of weighted formulas. We say that r entails a weighted formula (rp, a), written r I= (rp, a), iff every possibilistic model satisfying all the weighted formulas in r also satisfies (rp, a).
We propose now a Hilbert-style axiomatization2 of this logic: axioms of PGL (for Possibilistic Godel logic) are Godel logic axioms weighted by 1 plus the triviality axiom (rp, 0), and PGL inference rules are :
Generalized modus ponens:
Weakening:
Then the notion of proof in PGL is as usual and it will be denoted as f-PG. The soundness of this axiomatic system is given in the next theorem. In the previous section we have defined PGL, a general possibilistic logic over the many-valued Godel logic. Our aim in this section is, as in classical propositional logic programming systems, to define a sublanguage 2Notice the analogy with the classical Possibilistic logic [Dubois et a!., 1994c ], here we have just replaced the ax ioms of classical propositional logic with those of many valued Godel logic.
for logic programming which would enable us to de sign an efficient proof algorithm, based on a complete calculus for computing the maximum degree of pos sibilistic entailment of a propositional variable, called goal, from a set of weighted formulas.
To this end, we restrict ourselves to a Horn-rule sub language of the logic G, i.e. to formulas of the form:
Pk -+ q with k 2: 0, where p1, . .. , Pk , q are propositional vari ables, in the traditional logic programming style. As usual, we shall refer to the conclusion q and the set of premises p1, . .. , Pk as the head and the body, respec tively. We distinguish between two types of formulas in this sublanguage: fact when k = 0 (empty body) and are simply written q, and rule, otherwise.
Definition 3 (PGL clause) A PGL clause is a pair of the form (£P,a), where £Pi s either a fact or a rule and a E [0, 1] is a lower bound on the belief on £P in terms of necessity measures.
For PGL clauses we shall develop a simple and efficient calculus which will not need the whole logical appara tus of PGL of the previous section. But before we need to introduce some extra definitions and results.
Definition 4 (Maximum degree of possibilistic entailment) The maximum degree of possibilistic en tailment of a goal q from a set of PGL clauses P, de noted by llqiiP , is the greatest lower bound a E [0, 1] on the belief on q such that P f= (q, a). Thus, llqiiP =s up{ a E [0, 1] 1 P f= (q, a)} .
Theorem 2 The maximum degree of possibilistic en tailment of a goal q from a set of PGL clauses P is the least necessity evaluation of q given by the models of P. Thus, llqiiP = inf{N([q] l 7r ) l 1r f= P}.
Proof: We define a1 = sup{ a E [0, 1] I P f= (q, a)} and az = inf {N([q] l1r) l 1r f= P}. az 2: a1: As a1 = sup{ a E [0, 1] I P f= (q, a)} we have that P f= (q, a), for all a < a1. Then, for every model1r of P we have that N([q] l1r) 2: a for all a < a1. Thus, az = inf{N([q] l1r) l1r f= P} 2: a, for all a < a1, hence, az 2: a1.
az ::; a1: As az = inf{N([ q]l 1r) l 1r f= P} we have that N([q] l1r) 2: a2 for all model1r of P, that is P f= (q, az), and thus, az ::; sup{ a E [0, 1] 1 P f= (q, a)}= a1.
0 Corollary 1 Let P be a of PGL clauses and let s be a propositional variable. Then, P f= (s, llsllp).
To provide our possibilistic logic programming lan guage with a complete calculus for determining the maximum degree of possibilistic entailment we only need the triviality axiom and a particular instance of the generalized modus ponens rule introduced in the previous section:
Obviously, the axiom is a valid PGL clause and the in ference rule is sound as already proved in the previous section.
Definition 5 (Degree of deduction) A goal q is deduced with a degree of deduction a from a set of PGL clauses P, denoted by P f-* (q, a), iff there exists a finite sequence of PGL clauses C1, ... , Cm such that Cm = (q, a) and, for each i E {1, ... , m}, it holds that Ci E P, Ci is an instance of the axiom or Ci is ob tained by applying the above inference rule to previous clauses in the sequence.
Next, we define the syntactic counterpart of maximum degree of possibilistic entailment.
The maximum degree of deduction of a goal q from a set of PGL clauses P, denoted lqlp, is the greatest a E [0, 1] such that P f-* (q, a).
As the only inference rule of our proof method is the generalized modus ponens, within the framework of logic programming in which P is always a finite set of PGL clauses, there exists a finite number of proofs of a goal q from P, and thus, the above definition turns into lqlp =max{ a E [0, 1] 1 P f-* (q, a)}.
The following propositions are needed to prove com pleteness.
Proposition 1 If the only formulas in P with head q are recursive3, then llqiiP = lqlp = 0.
Proposition 2 Let (p, /3 ) and (p -t q, 'Y) be two PGL clauses such that p "# q. Then, llqll{(p ,/3),(p-+ q , -y)} = min(/3, 'Y).
Proposition 3 Let P be a set of PGL clauses and let (r -t q,'Y) be a clause of P. If llqiiP > llqiiP \{ (r -+ q,-y)} ' then llqiiP = llqll{(r,<>r),(r-+q,-y)}> where a r = llriiP· Proposition 4 Let P be a set of PGL clauses and let (q -t p,"f) be a clause of P. It holds that ll q ll p = llqiiP\{(q-tp ,-y )} · Theorem 3 (Completeness) Let P be a set of PGL clauses and let q be a goal. Then, llqiiP = lqlp.
Proof: By the soundness of the modus ponens infer ence rule, we have llqiiP 2: l q l p. Therefore, we must prove llqiiP :::; lqlp and we proceed by induction on n, where n is the number of clauses of P. If n = 1, then it must be that P contains only either one certainty-weighted fact or rule. We assume that q occurs in P as the head of a non recursive formula; otherwise, by Proposition 1, we have llqiiP = lqlp = 0.
Suppose that P contains only the certainty-weighted fact ( q, "'(). Let I0 and h be two interpretations such that Io( q ) < 1-"'( and ft( q ) = 1. Now, let 1r be a possibility distribution with the following definition:
It is easy to check that 1r f= ( q, "'f) and N([q] I 1r) "'f· Then, by Theorem 2, we have llqiiP = inf{N([qJI 1r ) I 1r f= (q, "'( )} :::; "Y· Now, lqlp =max{ a E [0, 1] I (q, "'( ) f-* ( q,a )} ="'(,and thus, llqiiP:::; lqlp .
Suppose that P contains only the certainty-weighted rule ( r --+ q, 'Y ) . Let I 0 be an interpretation such that I0 (r) :::; I0 ( q) < 1 and let 1r be a possibility distribution with the following definition:
It is easy to check that 1r f= (r --+ q, "'f) and N([ q JI 1r) = 0. Then, by Theorem 2, we have ll q llp = inf { N ( [ q] l 1r) l 1r f= (r--+ q,"'()} = 0, and thus, llqiiP:::; lqlp .
Suppose now that for any set P' that contains n clauses it holds that ll s iiP' :::; l s iP' for any propositional vari able s, and suppose that P contains n + 1 clauses. Since we are assuming that q occurs in P as the head of a non recursive formula, let (<.p,"'f) be a clause of P such that <.p is a non recursive formula with head q and "'( 2 8, for any clause ( 'ljJ, 8) of P such that 'ljJ is a non recursive formula with head q. We distinguish two cases:
Case ( <.p, 'Y) = ( q, "'(). Let I0 and h be two interpreta tions such that I0( q) < 1 -"'( and Io(p) = 1 for any propositional variable p =J. q, and h ( s) = 1 for any propositional variable s. Now, let 1r be a possibility distribution with the following defini tion:
1r(I) = 1 -"'f, if I = Io 0, otherwise Since "'( 2 8 for any non recursive clause ('1/J, 8) of P such that q is the head of 'ljJ, we have that 1r f= P and N([ q]l 1r) = 'Y· Therefore, by Theorem 2, we have llqiiP = inf{N([ q J I 1r) I 1r f= P} :::; "Y· Now, lqlp =max{ a E [0, 1] I P f-* (q,a )} 2 "'(, and thus, llqiiP :::; lqlp .
Case (<.p,"'f) = (p--+ q,"'(). If we define P' = P\{(p--+ q, "'()} we have that llqiiP 2 llqiiP'· If llqiiP = llqiiP' , by the induction hypothesis, we have that llqiiP' :::; lqiP' , and thus, llqiiP :::; lqiP·
If llqiiP > llqiiP' , by Proposition 3, llqiiP = llqll{(p,ap),(p--+q,7)}, where ap == IIPIIP, and, by Proposition 2, llqll{(p ,ap),(p--+q,7 )} = min(ap, "'f). Now, by Proposition 4, IIPIIP = IIPIIP' and, by the induction hypothesis, IIPIIP' :::; IPIP'· Since IPIP' :::; IPIP and (p--+ q , "'f) E P, applying the modus po nens inference rule, we get P f-* (q, min(IPIP, "'f)) with min(IPIP, "'f) 2 min (ap, "'f). Then, lqlp = max{ a E [0, 1 ] 1 P f-* ( q , a)} 2 min(IPIP, "'f ) , and thus, lqlp 2 min (ap, "Y ) = llqiiP·
D
In the particular case that we do not allow recursive formulas in the language, the underlying uncertainty logic of our logic programming system is syntactical equivalent to the family of infinitely-valued proposi tional logics the interpreter defined in [Escalada- Imaz and Manya, 1995] can deal with. The interpreter is based on a backward proof algorithm for computing the maximum degree of deduction of a propositional variable from a set of formulas whose worst-case time complexity is linear in the total number of occurrences of propositional variables in the set of formulas. We show bellow an example of PGL clauses the interpreter can deal with.
Example 1
The maximum degree of deduction of the goal friend_M ary_J ohn from the set of clauses P={ (M ary_is_young, 0.8), (John_is_young, 0.9), (Mary _is_young 1\ J ohn_is_young --+ friend_M ary_John, 0.6) }, is 0.6 which corresponds with the deduction degree computed by the interpreter when taking as triangular norm the min -conjunction function and as implication Godel's many-valued implication function.
ADDING FUZZY UNIFICATION
Our aim is to extend the calculus of our possibilistic language to allow a semantical matching between fuzzy propositional variables based on a necessity evaluation of fuzzy events. For instance, given the set of PGL clauses
where John_is_young and John_is_about16 are two fuzzy propositional variables, the maximum degree of deduction of the goal friend_M ary_John from Pi s 0 unless we be able to compute the necessity evaluation of the propositional variable John_is_young from the fact that the propositional variable John_is_about16 is certain with a necessity of at lest 0.9.
To tackle the fuzzy unification problem within our pos sibilistic framework we are lead (i) to fix a domain and an interpretation of fuzzy propositional variables in terms of its membership functions, otherwise we would not be able to identify when two propositional variables A and B are related and, furthermore, we would not be able to reason about the certainty of the propositional variable B from the fact that the domain-related propositional variable A is certain with a necessity of at least o:; and (ii) to define some mea sure to compute the necessity evaluation of a fuzzy propositional variable B based on a domain-related fuzzy propositional variable A.
PROPOSITIONAL VARIABLES WITH FINITE DOMAINS
With respect the underlying uncertainty logic de scribed in Section 2, the main difference is that now we attach propositional variables with a sort. In doing so, we are introducing a minor change in the seman tics. Many-valued interpretations should map a sort into a non-empty domain and a propositional variable into a value of its domain, and thus, in turn we need to provide a new notion of interpretation.
A more rigorous approach should be to define a first order language with typed regular predicates and sorted fuzzy constants (cf. [Alsinet et al., 1999] ) which would allow us to represent, for instance, the fuzzy statement "Mary is young" as age(M ary, young). However, since variables and function symbols are not allowed in the language, fuzzy propositional variables give us a more simple representation model without lost of expressiveness.
Definition 7 (Extended many-valued interpre tation) An interpretation I= (U, i, m) maps:
1. each sort a into a non-empty domain U,;
2. all propositional variables p of sort a into a same value i(p) E U,; and Notice that an interpretation I = (U, i, m) is disjunc tive in the sense that i(p) is a unique value of the domain U, for any propositional variable p of sort a, and i(p) =/:. i(p') iff p and p' are of different sorts.
In what follows, we shall denote by J.Lm(p) the member ship function of m(p). The truth value of a proposi tional variable p under an interpretation I= (U, i, m ), denoted by I(p), is computed as
These truth evaluations extend to rules in the usual way by using the truth functions described in Sec tion 2.
Remark that the truth value of a propositional vari able p under an interpretation I = (U, i, m) depends not only on the value i(p) assigned to p, but on the fuzzy set m(p). Therefore, in order to measure the certainty of a sorted propositional variable in a possi bilistic model we cannot take into account any possible interpretation, but only those which share a common interpretation of propositional variables, and hence which also share their domain. This leads us to de fine the notion of context (cf. [Alsinet et al., 1999] ) Remark that given a context 'Iu, m and a proposi tional variable p, there exist at least two interpreta tions Io,l1 E 'Iu ,m such that Io(p) = 0 and h (p) = 1.
Let us briefly discuss the reason for defining the notion of context by means of an example.
Example 2 Let age_M ary_around19 be a proposi tional variable of sort M ary_years_old and let Io = (U, i, mo) and h = (U, i, m1) be two interpretations such that
• U Mary_years-old = [0, 120](years),
• i(age_Mary_around19) = 20,
• mo(age_Mary_aroundlg) = [17; 18; 20; 21]-trape zoidal fuzzy set4-and 18; 19; 19; 20] .
Although the age of Mary is the same value in both interpretations, we have a different truth value in each interpretation depending on the membership function of the fuzzy set assigned to the propositional variable. are those such that 1r(I0) � 1 and 1r(h) = 0, and thus, Io can be fully plausible while h is inadmissible, how ever, Mary is twenty years old in both interpretations.
4
We represent a trapezoidal fu zzy set as [t1; tz; t3; t4], where the interval [h, t4] is the support and the interval [tz, t3] is the core.
Therefore, when fixing a particular context we are en suring that belief states modeled by normalized possi bility distributions on a set of possible interpretations (or possible states) are consistent, in the sense that possible states are sharing a common view of the real world.
Finally, the notion of possibilistic satisfaction can be easily extended in a particular context Iu, m in the fol lowing way. Given a context Iu,m, the models of a set of PGL clauses P are the normalized possibility distributions on the set of extended many-valued in terpretations Iu,m that satisfy all the clauses in P.
EXTENDED INFERENCE WITH POSSIBILISTIC PATTERN MATCHING
To provide PGL with a semantical matching mecha nism we need a measure for computing the necessity evaluation of the propositional variable B based on the domain-related propositional variable A. Further more, this measure should enable us to include new in ference patterns in our previous calculus of Section 4 in order to keep completeness for determining the maxi mum degree of possibilistic entailment of a goal form a set of PGL clauses in a particular context.
Again there are several alternatives. After a careful analysis we have chosen the same type of measure used when defining the possibilistic semantics for PGL. Namely, given a context Iu,m, the necessity evaluation of B based on the domain-related propositional vari able A is defined as
uEU� where =? is the reciprocal of Godel ' s many-valued im plication.
At this point we are ready to extend the calculus to allow a semantical matching of propositional vari ables with finite domains through a possibilistic pat tern matching measure based on a necessity evaluation of fuzzy events. Although there may exist several ap proaches, we have finally decided to extend the calcu lus with three inference rules. Given a context Iu,m , these inference rules are defined as follows: min( a, ;3) ) '
where ;3 = N ( m (p') I m (p)) . Thus, 7r I= (p' , min ( a, N ( m (p') I m ( p)))) as well.
D
Moreover, for a given a context Iu,m, the modus ponens style calculus extended with the SU, IN and UN inference rules is complete for determining the maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of a goal from a particular class of PGL clauses called well formed and satisfiable PGL programs. The formaliza tion of the notion of well-formed and satisfiable PGL program and the proof of completeness for this class of PGL clauses can be found in [Alsinet and Godo, 2000b] . for all I E Iu,m· Hence, P f= (John_is_aboutl6, 1), and thus, 11John_is_about16II P = 1. On the other hand, applying the IN rule to (John_is_14_16, 1) and (John_is_16_18, 1) we deduce (John_is..aboutl6, 1), and thus, 1John_is_abouh61P = 11John_is_abouh611P·
The introduction of fuzzy constants in logic program ming languages was suggested in the early eighties by [Cayrol et al., 1982] and [Bel et al., 1986] with the aim of including fuzzy values in a pattern matching procedure. Subsequently, [Umana, 1987] defined a fuzzy pattern matching process using the extension principle for one and two variate functions, and in [Baldwin et al., 1995] the authors implemented a se mantic unification procedure based on the theory of mass assignments which allows a unified framework for the treatment of fuzzy and probabilistic data. [Godo and Vila, 1995] proposed a possibilistic-based logic to deal with fuzzy temporal constraints based on many valued semantics and a necessity-like measure to allow a pattern matching mechanism between fuzzy tempo ral constraints. [Virtanen, 1998 ] defined a fuzzy unifi cation algorithm based on fuzzy equality relations and [Arcelli et al., 1998 ] proposed three different kinds of unification in the fuzzy context: the first one is based on similarity relations, the second one identifies sim ilar objects through an equivalence relation and the last one uses "semantic constraints" for defining a more flexible unification. More recently, [Gerla and Sessa, 1999] formalized a methodology for transform ing an interpreter for SLD Resolution into an inter preter that computes on abstract values which express similarity properties on the set of predicate and func tion symbols of a classical first-order language and [Formato et al., 2000] extended the unification algo rithm of Martelli-Montanari to allow a partial match ing between crisp constants through similarity rela tions. Finally, [Dubois et al., 1998 ] proposed an exten sion of possibilistic logic dealing with fuzzy constants and fuzzily restricted quantifiers (called PLFC), and [Alsinet et al., 1999] provided PLFC logic with a for mal semantics and a sound resolution-style calculus by refutation.
The main differences between this framework and PLFC [Alsinet et al., 1999] are (i) at the level of the syntax and semantics of the language, (ii) at the level of providing the language with a complete calculus, and (iii) at the level of defining a semantical unifica tion mechanism between fuzzy propositions.
In PLFC, formulas are pairs of the form (<p(x ), f(Y)), where x and y denote sets of free and implicitly uni versally quantified variables and y ;2 x, <p(x) is a dis junction of literals with fuzzy constants, and f(Y) is a valid valuation function which expresses the certainty of <p(x) in terms of necessity measures. Basically, val uation functions f(Y) are constant values and vari able weights which are not considered in our possibilis tic language. Variable weights [Dubois et al., 1994a; 1994b] are suitable for modeling statements of the form "the more x is A (or x belongs to A), the more certain is p(x)", where A is a fuzzy set. This is formalized in PLFC as, for all x, "p(x) is true with a necessity of at least JLA(x)", and is represented as (p(x), A(x)). When A is imprecise but not fuzzy, the interpretation of such a formula is just "Vx E A, p(x)". So A acts as a (flexi ble if it is fuzzy) restriction on the universal quantifier. On the other hand, fuzzy constants in PLFC can be seen as (flexible) restrictions on an existential quanti fier. In general, "L(B) is true at least to degree o:", is represented in PLFC as (L(B), o:), where L is either a positive or a negative literal and B is a fuzzy set. For instance, if B is imprecise but not fuzzy, (p(B), o: ) and (•p(B),o:) have to be read as "3x E B, p(x)" and "3x E B, •p(x)", respectively.
Therefore, because of the calculus for PLFC is defined by refutation through a generalized resolution rule be tween positive and negative literals, the unification (in the classical sense) between fuzzy constants is not al lowed. For instance, from s1: (•p(A) V '1/J, 1) and s2: (p(A), 1), which, if A is not fuzzy, are interpreted respectively as "(3x E A, •p(x)) V'l/J" and "3x E A, p(x)", we can infer '1/J iff A is a precise constant. However, a semantical unification between fuzzy events is per formed through variable weights and fuzzy constants. For instance, from s1: (•p(x) V '1/J(x), A(x)) and s2: (p(B), 1), which, if A and B are not fuzzy, are interpreted re spectively as "Yx E A, •p(x) V 7/J(x)" and "3x E B, p(x)", we infer (7/J(B), N(A I B)), where N(A I B) is a neces sity evaluation of fuzzy events.
In our current setting, fuzzy propositional variables are interpreted in the same way as fuzzy constants in PLFC but, in contrast to PLFC, we do not have nega tive literals in the language and we have provided the language with a complete modus ponens-style calcu lus for determining the maximum degree of possibilis tic entailment of a propositional variable from a set of formulas which can be extended, through a seman tical unification inference rule, to allow a semantical matching between propositional variables.
Concerning the semantics, because of the fuzzy in formation, the truth evaluation of formulas is many valued in both languages, and belief states are mod eled by normalized possibility distributions on the set of many-valued interpretations, also in both languages. However, the basic connectives of PLFC are negation • and disjunction V while in our language, they are con junction 1\ and implication -+, and the semantics for the two sets of connectives are not equivalent, i.e. the two sets of connectives are not inter-definable. More over, the extended necessity measure for fuzzy sets suggested by Dubois and Prade in [Dubois and Prade, 1991] , which is used in this language for setting the possibilistic semantics of formulas, is different from the one used in PLFC, although both are extensions of the standard necessity measure for crisp sets.
Finally, the proof method for PLFC is based on refu tation through a resolution rule, a fusion rule already proposed in [Dubois et al., 1998 ] and a merging rule. During the proof process, the merging rule must be ap plied after every resolution step, and thus, the proof algorithm cannot be oriented to a resolvent clause and therefore, the search space consists of all possible or derings of the literals in the input program. In con trast, in our current setting, the proof method is ori ented to propositional variables (goals) and can be performed in a bottom-up manner through a general ized modus ponens inference rule. In particular, when the semantical unification between fuzzy propositional variables is emulated by means of the following non logical axiom (p-+ p', N(m(p') I m(p))),
we can easily adapt the interpreter proposed in [Escalada-Imaz and Manya, 1995] for computing N(m(p ') I m(p)) in a particular context. However, as we have seen, this approach is not powerful enough for determining the maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of a goal q from a set of PGL clauses P.
